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JANUARY, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND TVVENTY-EIGHT
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass
by because they did not deal with the Constitution, or a telephone company, yet
which have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore some profound
interstitialchange in the very tissue of the law."-Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected
Legal Essays, p. 269.

NOTES ON MISSOURI CASES
BANKS AND BANKING-SENDING DRAFT TO DRAWEE "FOR COLLECTION"--DRAWEE AS A TRUSTEE. Bank of Poplar Bluff v. fillspaugh.1
One Reichert had $5,000 on deposit with the Bank of Puxico. She drew
a draft on that bank for this amount payable to plaintiff bank, directing the
latter to collect the same and deposit the money so collected to her account
with it. Plaintiff sent the draft directly to the Puxico Bank and demanded
payment. The latter accepted the draft but failed to pay it, and subsequently
became insolvent and suspended business. At the time that the Puxico Bank
received and accepted the draft, however, it had on hand sufficient funds to
have met plaintiff's demand. On this state of facts, the Springfield Court of
Appeals held that plaintiff was entitled to a preference and that the Commissioner of Finance, in charge of winding up the affairs of the insolvent bank,
should have paid plaintiff the full amount of Reichert's draft before permitting
other creditors of that bank to participate in its assets. This decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court, who adopted the opinion of the Court of
Appeals as its own. 2
The preference was allowed by reasoning somewhat along the following
lines: where one bank holds money as the agent of another, it holds the same
in trust, and this is so whether or not the money is kept in a separate fund.
Where money is held in trust and the trustee becomes insolvent, the beneficiary is entitled to the fund, because he is the equitable owner thereof and the
trustee has no real interest in the same to which his creditors should be able to
resort. When a bank has collected the amount of a draft, sent to it for collection and remittance, it holds the amount collected before remittance as a
trustee for the sender.
1.

(1925) 275 S. W. 579.

2.

(1926) 281 S. W.%733.
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After laying down these broad principles and citing authority to support
them, the learned Court held that the Puxico Bank received the Reichert
draft as plaintiff's agent "to present the draft to itself, collect it and send the
money to plaintiff."' It was then stated that as the Puxico Bank had on hand
sufficient funds, when the draft was presented to it, to have paid it, it was in
contemplation of law actually paid, because "equity will consider that as done
which ought to have been done." 4 After finding the facts that the Puxico
Bank was plaintiff's agent to collect the draft and that it had been paid, the
Court was inevitably led to the conclusion, within the rules above stated, that
the amount of the draft was held by the Puxico Bank as a trustee and plaintiff
was accordingly entitled to a preference. It was finally asserted by the Court
that from the time that "the draft was presented and accepted the Bank of
Puxico held plaintiff's $5,000 and this $5,000 passed to the Commissioner of
Finance and thereby increased the funds in his hands $5,000 above the actual
assets" of that bank.i
It is undoubtedly true that there is considerable authority to the effect
that if A sends a draft, drawn on Bank X, to Bank Y for collection and remittance either in specie, or by check, Y will be regarded as A's agent for
collection, and if Y does collect upon the draft, it will hold the money thus
gotten in trust for A whether or not such money is kept separate from Y's
other funds. There is no disposition to question the soundness of this rule of
0
law at this time, although there is considerable dissent therefrom. But is the
situation presented in the hypothetical case the same as that in the case under
review? If it is, and one is disposed to accept a doctrine to the effect that t
maxim in equity can convert a mere promise to pay into actual payment, the
decision of the learned Court of Appeals can be justified; otherwise the holding would seem to be unsound, and to violate the fundamental rule that in
the administration of insolvent estates "equality is equity" and preferences
should not be created except in perfectly clear cases. Unless one creditor's
position is clearly superior to that of other creditors, he should receive no favors
at the hands of a court of equity?
Interpreting the facts in the case under review in such a way as to make
possible a finding that the Puxico Bank was constituted plaintiff's agett seems
inaccurate. It is difficult to believe that plaintiff appointed this bank its
agent for any purpose. It seems more exact to say that plaintiff merely demanded payment of a draft from the drawee thereof, calling upon the latter
to perform its legal obligation. In fact, it seems, that plaintiff actually intended in this case to dispense with the usual agency for collection by sending
the draft to the drawee instead of forwarding it to a correspondent. If a distant creditor writes to his debtor requesting him to remit the amount of his
obligation, no one would characterize such action as the creation of an agency
for collection, even though the evidence of the indebtedness was sent and surrendered to the debtor in advance of payment; yet, it is submitted, that such
3.
4.
5.

275 S.W. 1.c. 580.
275 S.W. 1.c. 581.
275 S.W. 1.c. 582.

(1908) 139 Iowa 83, 117 N. W. 289. See also,
Midland Nat. Bank v. Brightwell (1898) 148 Mo.
358, 49 S. W. 994. But see,contra, Gonyer v.

6. The authorities on this question are fully

Williams (1914) 168 Cal. 452, 143 P. 736. Cf.

collected in annotations in 32 L. R. A. 715; 38
L. R. A. (N. S.)146, and L. R. A. 1917F 603.
See, in accord with the proposition stated in the
text, German Fire Ins. Co. v. Kimble (1896) 66
Mo. App. 370; Brown v. Sheldon State Bank

Lippitt v. Thomas Loan etc. Co. (1914j 88 Conn.
185, 90 A. 369.
7. 1 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. (4th ed.) sec. 410.
See, also, Williston, Sales (1909 ed.) see.143

tseq.
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a transaction differs in no substantial way from what occurred in the principal
case. It is accordingly urged that the premise upon which the Court of Appeals'
decision is founded cannot be sustained.8
In order that an owner of property, which has come to his hands unburdened with and free from an equity, may be charged as a trustee with
respect to the same, there must usually be a proper declaration of trust, accompanied by the creation of a trust fund or res. A party will not be held to
the duties of a trustee, if he merely promises to hold his own property in trust,
or promises to deliver his property in the future, unless perchance in either
case the promise is part of a specifically enforceable contract. If the promise
is of this nature, the promisor would be charged with some of the duties of a
trustee, and might, therefore, possibly be termed a constructive trustee; but,
in the absence of any such element as that last mentioned, it is essential to the
existence of a trust that the party to be charged as trustee express an intention
in regard to specific property to separate the legal title thereto from the beneficial interest therein, and to keep the former while presently giving the latter
to another. Whenever there is an intention to thus finally dispose of the beneficial interest there is a completed trust under the assumed conditions, but not
otherwise. 9
Assuming that the Puxico Bank was not chargeable as a trustee on
principles of the law of agency, as hereinbefore argued, can it be said that it
constituted itself a trustee for plaintiff within the proposition stated in the
last paragraph? It is believed that the mere act of accepting the Reichert draft,
which was all that the Puxico Bank did, could not possibly bring about any
such result. The Bank's acceptance amounted to nothing more than a promise
to pay the amount of the Riechert draft to plaintiff,O and there is no principle
of law known to the writer that makes a promise to pay a sum ofmoneyspecifically enforceable. To commence with, the Puxico Bank was Reichert's debtor,
under a contractual obligation to pay the amount that she had on deposit
to her, or her order.') When plaintiff presented Reichert's draft, and the
Puxico Bank accepted the same, it promised to pay plaintiff out of its own
funds S5,000 which sum, save for the draft, it would have been obliged to have
paid to Reichert upon her demand. What really occurred then was that the
Puxico Bank accepted plaintiff as its creditor in lieu of Reichert; the transaction really involved the substitution of one creditor for another, and a
promise upon the part of the Bank to pay the substituted party. Certainly
8. To further illustrate, suppose that the
Puxico Bank in the principal case had remitted
to plaintiff the amount of the draft less the usual
commission charged for collection; would this
have constituted a discharge of the obligation?
It is believed that such action would not have
amounted to a discharge; yet if the bank were a
real agent such a charge would have been entirely
proper.
9. See Perry, Trusts (6th ed.) sec. 1; Williston, Contracts sec. 355. See, also, Parks, Declarations of Trusts, 27 U. of Mo. Bull. L. Ser. 3 et
seq. Parks, Contracts for the Benefit of Third
Persons, 33 U. of Mo. Bull. L Ser. 3, 13.
10. "The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of the
drawer." Sec. 918, R. S. '19. Apparently, in

the principal case, there was no formal written acceptance. But in view of sec. 923 R. S. '19 which
provides, in substance, that a drawee who holds
a bill presented for payment more than twentyfour hours will be taken as having accepted the
same. The bank's position was the same as if
!t had actually given an acceptance.
11. "The depositor parts with his money and
the bank contracts to pay such checks as he may
draw to an amount not exceeding the sam deposited. The consideration which the depositor
receives for his money is the abtolute and unconditional contract by the bank to pay his checks
to the extent of his deposit." Tyson v. Western
Nat. Bank (1893) 77 Md. 412, 416. 26 A. SZ2.
See, also, Magee, Banks and Banking (3rd ed.)
sec. 171.
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the Puxico Bank did not presently declare that plaintiff was presently invested
with the beneficial interest in $5,000, then presently set apart by the Bank and
held for plaintiff. It is accordingly urged that, because of the absence of any
such action upon the Bank's part, there is no propriety in holding that a trust
relation was created. A mere promise to perform a contractual obligation to
pay a sum of money, even though the promisor at the time he gives his promise
happens to be able to perform the same does not create a trust, and yet a
proper analysis of the facts in the principal case discloses that that is all that
the Puxico Bank did. Why should it have been regarded as a trustee?
The case under review should not be confused with the type of transactions, above referred to and so often met with, where the holder of a draft
forwards the same to a correspondent to collect from the drawee, who is a
thirdparty. In such a case, if the correspondent collects the money due on the
draft, he receives a fund in which he has no beneficial interest, and which he
is bound to forward with due dispatch to his principal. In such a case there is
at the outset at least a trustee and a trust res. The money collected comes to
the collecting bank burdened with an equity. Many courts have felt that
the trust should continue even though the correspondent, after collecting upon the draft, commingles the amount of the collection with his other funds,
with the result that the owner of the draft may charge the correspondent's
funds with the full amount of the draft in the event of the latter's insolvency.
Perhaps th's last step, which the courts have taken, is open to technical objection, but, as a practical matter, and in spite of the fact that no trust res
can be identified, after the amount collected has been mixed with the correspondent's other funds, the correspondent's assets have been augmented and,
if creditors are permitted to share in the amount of the collected draft, they
would be satisfying their claims out of money to which their debtor had no
right, and which he should not have retained. The distinction between the
cases last discussed and the principal case seems clear enough, and to demand
the application of different rules for their solution. The Puxico Bank did not
receive money from any outside source; its assets were not increased to any
extent; it did not collect any money in plaintiff's behalf, which it was in good
conscience bound to hand over to plaintiff. It was merely asked to pay out
of its own money the amount of the draft, and this it promised to do. It is
difficult indeed under these conditions to discover any justification for allowing plaintiff a preference.
The Court of Appeals, in the principal case, stated as one of the reasons
for its decision that, after the Puxico Bank had accepted Reichert's draft, the
amount of the same belonged to plaintiff and, consequently, when its assets
passed into the hands of the Commissioner of Finance, he received $5,000 more
than belonged to it.12 Perhaps this was an effort upon the learned Court's part
to justify giving plaintiff a preference by demonstrating that the bank, at the
time it suspended, had on hand, for plaintiff's account, money in which it had
no legitimate interest, and that, for this reason, its assets had been augmented
in the same fashion that a correspondent's assets are increased after he has
collected his principal's draft from the drawee. If the Court had any such theory as this in mind, it is believed that it is untenable, and will not bear close
analysis.
The most that happened, when the Puxico Bank accepted Reichert's
draft, was that it, pursuant to its original obligation to Reichert, charged the'r
12.

275 S. W. I. c. 582.
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account with the draft and possibly credited plaintiff's account therewith.
Did the fact that the bank decreased its liability in this way to Reichert, when,
at the same time it assumed a like liability to plaintiff, produce any money in
its hands? Did this rearrangement of its obligation on its books result in the
Commissioner of Finance receiving more assets? To the writer it seems that
these questions must be answered in the negative. The Puxico Bank received
nothing as a result of such bookkeeping. It merely promised to pay plaintiff,
from the assets that it hadhad all along,the amount of Reichert's draft as it was

legally bound to Reichert to do under the banking arrangement existing between them. To say that the bank's act of recognizing plaintiff as payee of
the draft created more assets in the bank's vaults is to lay down as a fact that
which is a fiction.
The opinion in the principal case cited the Missouri case of Midland
NationalBank v.Brightwell" to sustain its decision among other authorities.
In that case plaintiff bank sent to the Slater Savings Bank drafts drawn
upon the Slater Bank by its depositors with instructions to remit the
amounts of the same to plaintiff. The Slater Bank charged the accounts of
the various depositors, whose drafts were thus presented to it, with the respective amounts of the same, and sent plaintiff a check for the aggregate sum
due. This check was drawn upon another bank and was never paid, because
the Slater Bank did not have sufficient funds to cover it. It appeared that at
the time that the Slater Bank charged its depositors' account, as above set
out, it did not have on hand sufficient funds to pay the various drafts sent it
by plaintiff. Later the Slater Bank was put into insolvency and plaintiff
claimed a preference, asserting that when the Slater Bank charged the drafts
against its depositors' accounts, it became plaintiff's trustee. But our Supreme
Court held that this was not the case, saying that "the facts failed to show that
the Slater Savings Bank had any funds on hand at the time that it made this
exchange on its books with which it could have met the checks of the depositors on whom the collections were sent.""* It was also stated that the Court
"was not disposed to hold that the mere canceling of the liability to one
debtor [creditor?] and the transferring it to another on the same books was
an actual increase of assets";'- and that no inference could be drawn that the
assets in the hands of the receiver were the "product of the collections sent by

plaintiff."I For these reasons the preference was denied, as it was said that
before plaintiff would be entitled to such a right (i. e. a preference) it would
have to be shown that the Slater Bank had had on hand sufficient money to
have paid the drafts when they were presented.
It seems quite obvious that the Midland National Bank case is not
square authority for the decision in the case under review. All that that case
really holds is that there can certainly be no preference in a case of this kind
if the drawee did not have funds to meet the draft when presented. The
intimation that there would have been a preference in the event of the drawee's
ability to pay the drafts, when presented, was mere dictum, and not necessary
in any way to the decision. Moreover, this dictum does not seem consistent
with the Court's general notion of the situation. The Court several times stated that the success of plaintiff's case depended upon the Slater Bank's having
received funds on plaintiff's account, and it was stated that, absent an augmen13.
14.

(1898) 148 Mo. 358, 49 S. W. 994.
148 Mo. 1. c. 366.

15.
16.

148 Mo. 1. c. 367.
148 Mo. L c. 367.
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tation of its assets, plaintiff's case failed, 7 To the writer it seems that there
would have been no such augmentation even though the Slater Bank could
have paid the drafts, and a holding that there was such an increase on the
strength of this dictum, which was unaccompanied by any explanation or reasons, seems unfortunate. The Midland Bank case does not actually stand for
the proposition that a mere matter of bookkeeping will produce assets.
In addition to the case last discussed the Court of Appeals in the principal
case cited as further authority for its conclusions National Bank v. Coldwater
National Bank,18 State v. Bank of Commerce,"9 State National Bank v. First
National Bank2° Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hanover State Bank,2'
FederalReserve Bank v. Bohannan,22 FederalReserve Bank v. Peters,3 Board
of Supervisors v. Prince Edward-Lunenburg Co. Bank,24 and Nyssa-Arcadia
Drainage District v. First NationalBank.25
National Bank v. Coldwater National Bank, State v. Bank of Commerce
and State National Bank v. First National Bank were cases where one bank
forwarded drafts drawn on a second bank to a third bank for collection, and
the decision in each case was that the collecting bank held the proceeds of the
collected drafts in trust for the bank that had forwarded the instruments for
collection. These cases have already been discussed herein, and they are
clearly distinguishable from the cases under review, and should, therefore, not
be regarded as controlling authority here.
Board of Supervisors v. Prince Edward-Lunenburg Co. Bank holds that if
an insolvent bank takes a deposit from an innocent depositor, knowing at the
time that it is insolvent, it becomes ex maleficio a trustee of the funds so deposited, because of the fraud necessarily involved in such a transaction. It
seems needless to add that such a case furnishes no authority to guide us in the
solution of our problem.
In FederalReserve Bank v. Peters and Federal Reserve Bank v. Bohannan,
the facts were the same as those in the principal case, and in each instance the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the drawee, upon the receipt
of the draft, became a trustee to the value thereof, if the drawee had in hand
sufficient assets to have paid the draft. The reasons advanced by the Virginia
Court for this holding were the same as those advanced by our Court of Appeals. In fact the Court of Appeals quoted at considerable length and with approval from the Peters case.
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. HanoverState Bank and in Nyssa-4r.
cadia Drainage District v. First National Bank A sent a draft, drawn on B
Bank, to C Bank for collection. In each instance B paid the draft to C by its
check drawn on C. C then charged B's account with the amount of the draft,
and in turn sent its check for this amount to A, but failed before the check so
sent was paid. In the Goodyear case the Kansas Court held that A had a pref.
17. "When this court has spoken of assets
being increased by the reception of a trust fund
heretofore it clearly meant actual assets, not the
mere juggling of accounts whereby debts due
depositors were transferred to become a debt
due a correspondent who sent collections." 148
Mo. I. c. 367. Assume that at the time a draft is
presented to the drawee for collection the latter
has assets with which to pay the same; that it
does not pay it but merely transfers its liability
to the owner of the draft; would not such a

transaction also be a mere "juggling of accounts"
producing no actual assets?
18. (1896) 49 Neb. 786, 69 N. W. 115.
19. (1901) 61 Neb. 181, 85 N. W. 43.
20. (1916) 124 Ark. 532, 187 S. W. 673.
21. (1921) 109 Kan. 772, 204 P. 992.
22. (1925) 127 S. E. 161.
23. (1924) 139 Va. 4., 123 S. E. 379.
24. (1924) 138 Va. 333, 121 S. E. 903.
25. (1925) 3 Fed. (2d) 648.
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erence and that C was A's trustee. It was said that the result of B's paying C
by check was the same as though B had drawn the money out from C and had
then used this money to pay C as A's agent. In this way the Court was able
to find that C's assets had been increased or augmented to the amount of A's
draft, and that C was consequently a trustee to this extent. The decision was
not unanimous, and there was a strong dissent by Mason, J., who said that C's
"assets were in no way increased" as a result of what occurred and that C had
merely "exchanged one creditor for another."26 In the Nyssa-Arcadia Drainage Districtcase the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that A
was not entitled to a preference, and that C could not be regarded as A's
trustee, that when C received B's check C merely shifted his liability from B
to A.
It would seem that the problem presented by the two cases last considered
can be regarded as substantially the same as, and analogous to that involved
in the case under review. In each instance a bank, having sufficient means to
do so, was obligated to pay a draft drawn upon itself and in its hands, and remit the amount thereof to plaintiff. The Goodyear case, therefore, may be regarded as authority to sustain the opinion of the Court of Appeals. But is the
position taken in the Goodyear case desirable? Would it not be sounder to say
that money can be claimed from an insolvent bank as a preference or trust
fund only when such bank has received the same from an outside source, having no real interest therein? Is it not accurate to say that the fact that "the
liabilities of the bank may have been diminished does not answer the purpose
for the liabilities of an insolvent bank are not the equivalent of cash" ;1In other words the sole justification for giving a party, situated as the owner of
a draft is situated in this type of case, should be a situation where it appears
that the insolvent bank has gotten additional assets in the form of money which
belongs to the plaintiff. If such a situation can be found to exist, the money
can be returned to the party rightfully entitled thereto without injuring other
creditors of the bank or depriving them of any real right. This is true, because
without such money each creditor will receive all that was his just due.S On
the other hand, if a preference be given a creditor where no such money has
been received, the result will inevitably be to divert assets, in which all creditors should share, to the exclusive benefit of a mere owner of a draft.-i
In American Bank of De Soto v. Peoples Bank of De Soto*9 the facts were
the same as in the principal case, and the Saint Louis Court of Appeals held
that there was no preference. The Court there said that the drawee was not
the agent of the payee of the draft; that the draft was not forwarded for collection but payment, and never was paid. The same result was reached by the
New York Court in People v. Merchants' and Mechanics' Bank.30 That Court
characterized the notion that the drawee bank became the agent of the payee
of the draft when it was presented to it as "ingenious" and "metaphysical"
but at the same time as one in which it was unable to concur or follow.3
26. 109 Kan. 1.c. 775.
27. Mason, J. dissention in the Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co. case, supra, note 21, 109
Kan. L c. 774.
28. See dissenting opinion of Mason, J. in
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. case, supra note 21,
109 Kan. 1. c. 774 et ,eq.where the contention of
the writer is forcefully stated.

28a. See Zimmerli v. North Bank & Tr. Co.
(1920) 111 Wash. 624, 191 P. 788, 17 A. L. R.
192, 2nd note, for an analogous case, where the
court held that there was no trust fund or preference.
29. (1923) 255 S. IV.943.
30. (1879) 78 N. Y. 269.
31. 78 N. Y. c. 272 Ct
Lee.
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In view of the authority to sustain a decision denying plaintiff a preference
in the case under review, and of the general policy against the allowance of
preferences except in the clearest of cases, it seems unfortunate that plaintiff
was not required to share in the Puxico Bank's alltoo limited assets along
with other creditors and on the same basis.
J. L. P.
BANKS AND BANKING-WHEN DEPOSITOR WHOSE CHECK
IS NOT HONORED IS ENTITLED TO A PREFERENCE. Claxton v.
Cantley.'
Plaintiff had on deposit with the Farmers' Bank the sum of $1,000.70.
He drew a check on that bank for this amount, payable to the order of the
Bank of Mansfield, directing the latter to collect the check for his account with
it. This check was presented to the Farmers' Bank for payment on May 11th
1926, but was not honored because the Farmer's Bank erroneously thought
that plaintiff was under a contractual obligation to leave his deposit with it.
On May 16th, 1926 the Farmers' Bank, being insolvent, suspended business
and its affairs were taken over by the Commissioner of Finance. At the time
that plaintiff's check was presented for payment, the Farmers' Bank had on
hand sufficient funds to have paid the same, and this much money came into
the hands of the Commissioner. Plaintiff claimed a right to a preference, to
the full amount of his deposit, on the ground that his check could have and
should have been paid by the Farmer's Bank when presented to it for that
purpose. The Springfield Court of Appeals allowed the preference as prayed for
disposing of the question by saying, in part, that plaintiff "should not be made
to suffer by the wrongful act of the bank in refusing to pay the check."' 2
Apparently, the Court was of the opinion that the principal case came
within the rule adopted in Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh, reviewed in
this number of the Bulletin,3 so as to require a preference to be given plaintiff.
Is the case here considered one presenting a situation similar to that in the
Millspaughcase so that it is within the sweep of the principles therein laid down?
The only substantial difference between the two cases is that in the
Millspaugh case the check was sent directly to the drawee with a request to
remit the amount thereof, and was accepted by the drawee, whereas in the
case under review the check was presented to the drawee for payment but the
latter refused to comply with this request, denying liabilty upon the check at
that time. It will be recalled that the Court in the Millspaugh case was able to
find that there was a trust fund upon which a preference was based, because of
the fact that the check had been sent to the drawee with the instructions to
remit and the drawee had accepted the check and undertaken to perform the
requested act. The theory of the Court was that under these circumstances
the drawee bank became the agent of the owner of the check, and it was then
held, after finding a fictitious payment of the same, that the drawee as an
agent held the amount of the check thus paid in trust for the payee thereof.
It is believed that the entire ratio decidendi of the Millspaugh case was predicated upon an agency, which the Court held existed because the drawee of the
check accepted the same, and it is urged that in the absence of the existence of
1. (1927) 297 S.W. 975.
2. 297 S.W. 1. c. 976.

3. (1925) 275 S. W. 579, (1926) 281 S. W.
733. See first case note in this number of the
Bulletin, where this case is reviewed.
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an agency for collection in any given case the Millspaugh case is not authority
for allowing a preference.
Can there be said to have been an agency in the principal case so that we
may adopt the ingenious reasoning of the Millspaughcase and by so doing conclude that the Farmers' Bank was either plaintiff's or the Bank of Mansfield's
agent? It is believed that no such assertion can be made in the face of the
actual facts. No man or bank can be forced into the position of an agent. The
relation of principal and agent results from a voluntary agreement between the
parties. Now there was no element of assent upon the part of the Farmers'
Bank in the case under review; it did not consent to do anything for either
plaintiff or the Bank of Mansfield-quite the contrary, instead of accepting
plaintiff's check upon presentment, it rejected it and declined to discharge its
legal obligation. Surely no agency can be said to have been created as a result of the Farmers' Banks' denying its liability as a drawee unless, indeed,
it can be said again that, because it was the duty of the bank to have accepted
and paid the check, equity, regarding that as done which ought to have been
done, will conclusively presume that the bank had done these things and, as a
result of this fiction, had in hand, as plaintiff's agent and trustee, the amount
of the check. To give to this equitable maxim such a far reaching effect as
this, and to have it accomplished, against the will of the bank, the performance of two legal duties (i.e. acceptance and payment of a check, which was
in fact rejected) seems altogether unwarrantable and improper. Yet, without
invoking the maxim's aid in this almost magical way, it is difficult to perceive
how the learned Court of Appeals could have found, within the principles of
the Millspaugh case, an agency or a trust fund.
In the course of its opinion the Court said, in the case under review, that
had the bank paid the check, as it was its duty to have done, "Claxton [i.e.
plaintiff] would have had 81,000.70 and the assets of the bank when it closed
would have been S1,000.70 less." That "the legal effect, therefore, of thewrongful act of the bank in refusing to pay the check was to swell the assets of the
bank at the time of its closing in the same amount."' Obviously, and so far
as the actual facts are concerned, there was no "swelling" of the bank's assets.
Neither in this case was there any trust fund created by a process of bookkeeping as there was in the Millspaugh case. In order that that result might
have been brought to pass the Farmers' Bank would have had to have cancelled an admitted liability to plaintiff on the check and assumed a like liability to the Bank of Mansfield as the payee thereof. But no such cancellation
and assumption occurred, because the Farmers' Bank refused to admit any
liability at all upon the check at the time of its presentment. The real situation, after payment of the check had been demanded, was that the bank refused to admit its liability under its contract with plaintiff as its depositor.
Under such conditions, it is urged that it is impossible to find that the bank's
assets were increased either in fact or on paper.
As was pointed out in this number of the Bulletin by the writer, in his
comment on the case of Bank of Poplar Bluff v. fillspaugh, some courts
have held that where the drawee of a check or draft assumes to pay the amount
thereof to the payee at the same time cancelling his liability to the drawer,
this bookkeeping transaction is the equivalent of augmenting the drawee's
funds to the amount of the check or draft, and, therefore, entitles the payee to
4.

297 S. W. l. c. 976, et seq.
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a preference. As the writer has already intimated, such a holding is considered
unsound and unfortunate from a business point of view. This is believed to be
so because the transaction really only involves substituting one creditor for
another, and the act of decreasing a liability to one person, while assuming
a like liability to another, does not bring real cash to the drawee's hands. But
even this last rule, which seems bad enough, does not require us to hold that
a trust fund exists (with its ensuing preference) whenever a depositor arranges to have his check presented to the drawee for payment, through the
medium of another bank, if payment is refused at a time when the drawee was
able to have paid it. The two cases are clearly distinguishable, and call for the
application of different rules (even if one were disposed to give a preference
in the first assumed case.) In the first case it is possible, as the result of specious reasoning, to find a paper trust fund. But in the second case on no line
of reasoning can such a fund be found.
Perhaps the rule in Bank of PoplarBluff v. Millspaugh is here to stay, and
Missouri bankers must live with it. It is to be hoped, however, that this will
not be so with the principal case and that our Supreme Court may soon have
an opportunity to correct the error, and to characterize such a relation as that
existing between plaintiff and the Farmers' Bank as being one merely of creditor and debtor.
J.L. P.
CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS-TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS-STOCK
DIVIDENDS AS PART OF CORPUS OF TRUST FUND. Hayes v. Saint
Louis Union Trust Co.1
Testator died possessed of two hundred American Tobacco Company
shares of stock, which he bequeathed to defendant as trustee. By the terms of
the will, defendant was required to pay the net income derived from the trust
fund to testator's children and their descendants per stirpes until the death of
the last surviving child, and at that time to pay over to his grandchildren and
their descendants per stirpes the principal of the trust estate. After testator's
death, but before the death of his last surviving child, the American Tobacco
Company declared stock dividends, and new certificates were delivered to

defendant. The question was, who was entitled to these new shares? Should
such shares be given to the life tenants under the trust as income, or should
they be retained by defendant as capital-as a part of the corpus of the trust
fund? The Supreme Court of Missouri held that such new shares were not to
be treated as income, but were to be added to the trust fund and kept by defendant as a part thereof. The case was one of first impression in Missouri,
and presents an interesting and important question.
The learned Court adopted a rule, which prevails in Massachusetts and
which was adopted in that jurisdiction by the case of Minot v. Paine,2 where
it was said that a simple method of determining the rights of the parties was
"to regard cash dividends, however large, as income, and stock dividends,
however made, as capital."' The simplicity of the application of this rule seemed to appeal to our Court, but at the same time, it was also said that "stock
dividends were not income of the trust estate but an accretion to the corpus
1. (1927) 298 S.W. 91
2. (1868) 99 Mass. 101, 96 Am. Dcc. 705.

3. 99Mass.i.c. 108.
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because of their nature, and because they represent no money or property
severed from the capital assets"' of the corporation.
Before considering the merits of the Missouri Court's decision, it may be
well to state briefly the other two rules that have been applied in this type of
case. One is known as the Pennsylvania rule, and the other as the Kentucky
rule. Under the Pennsylvania rule a court will investigate the source of
corporate profits out of which new shares have been created and issued and, if
itis found that any of such profits were earned after the creation of the trust,such
portion of the new shares as were earned during this period will be turned over
to the life tenants as income-as the yield of the trust fund-while the rest of
the new shares will be added to the corpus of the fund, and considered as capital, going ultimately to the remainderman under the trust.$ Under this rule,
a court is only concerned with the substance of the transaction, and does not
concern itself "with the form in which the corporation has seen fit to clothe"
the particular dividend. 6 It matters not that, as a result of what the corporation has done, new shares have been issued, and capital thus increased, this
rule requires the question to be asked in each case, were profits capitalized
and when were the profits earned? And the proposition is, that if profits were
capitalized and the same were earned prior to the creation of the trust fund,
then the shares representing them will be allocated to the corpus of the fund,
but if such profits were earned after the creation of the trust fund they will
be alloted to income.
Under the Kentucky rule, the source of the shares is not ascertained, but
all shares are regarded as income and given to the life tenants. Probably the
leading case to this effect is Hite v. Hite," where the Kentucky Court said that
"if the divdend be in fact a profit, although declared in stock, it should be held
to be income"' s and that "no inquiry will be made in such a case as to what
portion of the profit upon which the dividend was based was earned before or
after the death of the testator, for the purpose of apportioning it between the
tenant for life and the remainderman."' 9 It was also stated that a stock dividend, by whatever name it might be called, was in substance "the income of
the capital invested,"Io and that issuing such a dividend was a mere means of
"distributing the profit.""1
Obviously the Massachusetts rule, which our Supreme Court adopted, is
easy to apply and, for this reason and in this sense, is convenient. It demands
the services of no experts and, like most rules of convenience, will aid in the
prompt dispatch of judicial business-a most desirable matter, if possible, in
the administration of decedents' estates. Unless, therefore, the application
of this rule defeats the intentions of a testator and, as a result of so doing, deprives beneficiaries under a testamentary trust of their lawful rights, there
should be no objection to its adoption in this State.

4. 298 S. W. 1.. 99.
5. While this rule probably had its origin in
Pennsylvania, one of the best discussions of it is
to be found in the case of Re Osborne (1913) 209
N. Y. 450, 103 N. E. 723, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.)
510 and note. See, also, notes in 35 L. R. A.
(N. S.)563, L. R. A. 1916D 201,24A. L. R. 9 and
42 A. L. R. 448. The Massachusetts rule is now
in force in New York as a result of a statute.
See 1 Laws, N. Y. 1926 p. 939, and 2 id. p. 1563.

The Osborne case was not overruled by judicial
decision.
6. The quotation is from Thompson. Corporations (2nd ed.) sec. 5414, where the learned author was discussing the problem herein involved.
7. (1892) 93 Ky. 254, 20 S. W. 778.
8. 93 Ky. 1. r. 267.
9. 93 Ky. L c. 26S.
10. 93 Ky. 1.c. 266.
11. 93 Ky. L e. 266.
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It would seem, however, that the only proper manner by which to test
the desirability of this rule is by inquiring whether or not it will carry out a
testator's intention? If it is found that it will not accomplish this purpose,
it should never have been followed, unless, indeed, no rule can be found which
will reach this end or, if such a guide can be found, its administration will be
so difficult that carrying it into effect, with reasonable ease, will be impossible. Let us first determine whether or not the Massachusetts rule does give
due effect to a testator's intentions. Does the allocation of allshares, comprised
within a stock dividend, to the capital fund of a trust carry out or defeat the
will of the creator of a trust who leaves the income of such trust to persons for
their respectives lives?
To the writer there seems to be but one answer to this question, and that
is, that the Massachusetts rule does arbitrarily or, at least, may defeat the
entire scheme of the trust. It is not perceived how it can be denied that such
dividend in substance, if not in form, represent income. The shares come directly from earnings, which the parties to the corporate organization desire to convert from the time of the declaration of the dividend into capital. But no such
increase in the corporate capital would be possible except for the fact that
profits have been earned, which may be capitalized. The new capital is derived from the yield of the oldfund.
Should it not be said that testator in the principal case, having given the
income of the trust fund to his children, desired every particle of profit yielded
by the original fund to go to the latter? If this was the case, what difference
should it make what form-a matter necessarily within the control of the
constituent parts of the corporation-the profits might happen to take?
Suppose, for example, that it had been the policy of the corporation-a policy,
which is occasionally highly desirable from the point of view of corporate finance
-to return all of its earnings to the capital fund, could it reasonably be said
that it would have been the testator's intention to have cut off his children
altogether?"It is believed that if the possibility of the declaration of stock dividends
had been called to testator's attention before his death he would have expressed himself somewhat along the following lines: "If the corporation for one
reason or another declares stock dividends during the life of this trust, I desire
those earnings in that form to go to my children, my only concern being that
the trust fund as constituted at the time of my death shall be kept intact for
my grandchildren."1z On the other hand, it is thinkable that the testator
might have said, "I want all dividends, whether in cash or in shares, to go to
my children so long as they are declared after the creation of this trust. I
regard all such dividends as profits and income within the meaning of my will,
and it is immaterial to me at what time the profits from which such dividends
may be declared were earned by the corporation." But it is hardly thinkable,
for the reasons above given, that testator would have said, "I desire all stock
11a. "A singular state of case-it seems to us
an unreasonable one-is presented, if the cornpany . . . can bind the courts as to the proper
ownership of it Ii. e.a dividend], and by the mode
of payment substitute its will for that of the testator, and favor the life tenant or remainderman as
it may desire." Hite v. Hite, supra note 7. 93
Ky.1.c. 266.

12. "if any presumption is to be indulged, It
seems that the creator of the trust intends . . .
that the life beneficiary shall receive all the profits
of the stock earned during the life tenancy, which
may be released from corporate control by distri.
bution among the stockholders during the existence of the life estate, in whatever form the dls.
tribution may be made." Re Heaton (1915) 89

Vt. SS0, 562, 96 A. 21.
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dividends to go to my grandchildren, and only cash dividends to go to my

children." Imputing such an intention to testator seems altogether unreasonable and not to attribute to the word "income" a meaning anywhere near approximating the common conception of that term.
It would seem that testator probably intended that the trust fund should
be kept intact, so far as its value was concerned, from the time that the trust
was created. It is reasonable to regard such value as that of the investment.
For this reason, if the American Tobacco Company had on hand, at the time of
testator's death, undivided profits, which were later capitalized by means of
the declaration of a stock dividend, such shares as represented previous earnings should have been alloted to the corpus of the trust and preserved for testator's grandchildren; these previous earnings appearing in the form of new
shares should be regarded as a part of the principal amount of the investment.
But all other earnings would be properly characterized as income, and should,
therefore, go to testator's children.
The Kentucky rule hardly seems to give effect to a testator's intention
in this type of case. Suppose that a man buys one hundred shares of corporate
stock at a price above par; would he regard his investment as amounting to a
sum equal to one hundred times the par value of the shares, or would he consider it as an investment of the sum which he actually put into the purchase?
It seems certain that the prudent man would estimate his investment at a
higher figure and, consequently, if thereafter an extraordinary dividend of
one kind or another were declared, resulting in bringing the value of his shares
down to par again, he would not feel that he was leaving his capital unimpaired
if he were to spend all of such dividend. Under the supposed conditions, the
prudent man's disposition-if he intended not to encroach upon his capitalwould be to make an appropriate allocation of such a dividend; he would
regard as income and therefore consumable, only so much of this extraordinary dividend as remained after he had deducted therefrom and added to
his capital fund an amount sufficient to bring the latter back to the figure at
which he had purchased the shares originally. It is for these reasons that the
Pennsylvania rule seems preferable to the Kentucky rule. After all, we should
attribute to a testator the intentions of a reasonably prudent man, and assume
that he would desire to have his testamentary estate managed and disposed of
in the manner that such a man would dispose of and manage his own estate.
Possibly the matter of apportioning the shares and allocating a proper
number of principal and income, as required by the Pennsylvania rule, may be
one of some difficulty. At the same time, this ought not to deter courts from
undertaking their clear duty to carry out a testator's desires. Surely such a
task can not present insurmountable difficulties. It is hardly likely that in
these days of expert accounting, and in times when all corporations must keep
annual accounts for the purposes of taxation, if for no other reasons, the actual
figures can not be ascertained with a reasonable degree of accuracy, and a
proper distribution made. Certainly, the fact that determining the amount of
shares that should go to each fund might be a matter of some expense, should
not justify a court's giving all of the shares to persons possibly not entitled to
any of them.lu
12a. "One is led to question whether, in their
desire to form a workable rule of easy application,
the courts that adopt the Massachusetts rule
have not unconsciously preferred expediency to
justice." Re Heaton, supra note 12, 89 Vt. 1.c.

559. "...
despite the dificulties attending it,
the court should endeavor in every cast to do
justice between the parties and at the same time
effectuate the intention of the creator of the
trust."i.S71.
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It has been said that stock dividends are not income because after the
transaction "the corporation is no poorer and the stockholder is no richer than
they were before."13 As a matter of fact, is the shareholder any richer after the
declaration of a cash dividend than he was before? A proper analysis of this
question would lead one to say that he is not. Before the declaration of the
dividend his share is worth on the market approximately its par value plus the
undivided surplus held by the corporation; but after the dividend has been
declared and is payable, whether it be in stock or cash, his share is worth proportionately less and in the same proportion. A stock dividend is something
more than a bookkeeping transaction. In the first place it is a division of profits among the shareholders. While it is true that there is no actual payment
of money, still it can not be accurately denied that such a dividend is a payment in money's worth. This is so because the new shares can be disposed of
as readily as the old ones.
The Massachusetts rule is said to have found favor in the federal Supreme
Court, and that Court undoubtedly has followed this rule when dealing with
the question whether or not a stock dividend should be regarded as income, and
taxable as such, under the federal income tax law.14 It is rather peculiar to
note in this connection that the Massachusetts Court has held that a stock dividend is taxable as income, while holding at the same time, as herein noted,
that such a dividend is to be considered as capital for purposes of distribution under a trust. The Massachusetts income tax law is substantially the same
in its various provisions as the federal act. In this connection, the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts in Tax Commissioners v. Putnam's said, "in es-

sence the thing which has been done [i. e. when a stock dividend has been
declared] is to distribute a symbol representing an accumulation of profits,
which instead of being paid out in cash is invested in the business, thus augmenting its durable assets. In this aspect of the case, the substance of the
transaction is no different from what it would be if a cash dividend had been
declared with the privilege of subscription to an equivalent amount of new
shares."IG And the same Court, in speaking of its rule regulating the distribution of stock dividends under a trust, has said in no uncertain terms that
the rule is merely one of convenience, which is arbitrary and may "sometimes
defeat the intention of the testator."' ?
The learned Court in the case under review stated that "a stock dividend
is not in any true sense a dividend at all. The latter implies a division, a severance from corporate assets of the subject of the dividend, and a distribution
thereof among its stockholders."" s Possibly, as a matter of bookkeeping this
description may be accurate, but when the substance of the transaction is
examined into, is not the Massachusetts Court correct when it says that the
transaction in reality is the same as if the corporation had distributed cash
to the shareholder which he, entitled to as earnings, immediately returned as
capital?
In conclusion, it is urged that the principal case presented a situation
where the new shares, resulting from the stock dividend, represented the yield
of testator's investment; that if such yield accrued after the creation of the
13. Town v. Eisner (1918) 245 U. S. 418,426,
38 S. Ct. 158, 62 L. Ed. 372.
14. Town v. Eisner, supra note 13, Eisner v.
Macomber (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189,
64 L. Ed. 521.

15. 227 Mass. 522,116 N. E. 904.
16." 227 Mass. I. c. 535.
17. D'Ooge v. Leeds (1900) 176 Mass. 558,
560, 57 N. E. 1025.
18. 298 S. W. 1. c. 98.
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trust, it should have been considered as trust income and distributed among
testator's children, the life tenants under the trust.
I. F.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES-RIGHT OF JUDGMENT CREDITOR TO
RESORT TO LAND DEVISED IN CONSIDERATION OF SERVICES
RENDERED TESTATOR. Gammon v. McDowell et al.,
Defendant's testator orally promised one Hayes to devise certain land to
Hayes, if the latter would care for him during his natural life. After giving this
promise, testator duly executed a will to this effect, devising the land to Hayes
"in the event that he shall remain with me and care for me during my natural
life."'2 Hayes did care for testator and, upon testator's death and the probate of his will, took possession of the land as devisee.
Plaintiff had recovered a judgment against defendant, as executor, the
same being for the amount of a debt due him from testator. The judgment
remained unsatisfied, and apparently testator left no assets at the time of his
death undisposed of available for the payment of this judgment. Plaintiff,
accordingly, brought this proceeding to procure authority to sell the land devised to Hayes to satisfy this obligation. Relief was granted plaintiff by the
Trial Court, but upon appeal the Supreme Court reversed this decision. It
was held that Hayes' rights as devisee were superior to those of plaintiff as a
judgment creditor-that the land devised to Hayes could not be reached as
assets liable to pay testator's established debts.
The learned Court reached this conclusion by finding that a contract
existed between Hayes and testator at the time of the latter's death and that
the will indicated that it was the intention of testator (which intention, it was
said, had to be the Court's "monitor"') "to set apart his real estate to meet the
obligation that he had thus incurred." 4 It was also stated that the devise to
Hayes was founded "upon a valuable consideration and the devisee sustained
the relation towards the realty of a purchaser and not a mere creditor or the
recipient of the bounty of the testator."'
Upon a person's death our statutes charge all of his property with the
payment of his debts. In this day no one may take and hold property under
a will as a mere legatee or devisee when the same is needed to discharge a testator's valid obligations.s To carry out these statutory requirements it has been
held, and rightly so, that a provision in a will to the effect that a legatee or
devisee shall hold property against a creditor is nugatory.cs The statute provides in substance that claims against a decedent's estate shall be paid in the
following order: (1) Funeral expenses; (2) expenses of last sickness, servant's
wages and the reasonable cost of a tombstone; (3) debts and taxes due the
State and municipal corporations; (4) judgments rendered against the testator
in his lifetime unless they are liens upon his real estate;' (5) all demands
without regard to quality proved against the testator's estate within six months
1. (1927) 298 S.W. 34.
2. 298 S.W. I.c. 36.
3. 298 S.W. I.c. 36.
4. 298 S.W. I.e. 36.
5. 298 S.W. I.c. 36.
6. Sees. 111, 112, and 141 Rev. Stat, of 1919.
6a. Carson v. Walker (1852) 16 Mo. 68;
Shaw v. Nicholay (1860) 30 Mlo. 99. "A testator

cannot deprive his executor of the power of s -Uing
his lands for the payment of his debts by devising
them away."
7. In the event of claims being liens upon the
decedent's real estate elaborate provistons are
made which need not be considered here. See See.
181 Rev. Stat. of 1919.
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after the date of granting first letters on the estate; and (6) all demands proved
after the end of such six months and within one year after the date of granting first letters on the estate.$ It is further provided that in the event of the
estate being insolvent the assets, after the payment of expenses of adminis9
tration, shall be apportioned among the creditors. While certain priorities
are allowed under the statute, it is clearly provided that no creditor in a given
class may take more than his pro rata share of available assets to the injury of
other creditors similarly situated.
In view of the foregoing rules regulating the disposition of a deceased
debtor's property, it follows naturally enough that if a testator dies insolvent
and he makes one creditor a legatee or devisee with the end in view that such
gift shall operate as a discharge of his obligation due such creditor, and the
latter is not entitled to a priority as against other creditors under the statute,
he may not keep the property thus left him to the detriment of such other
creditors, and this will be so even though the testator expressed a desire to this
effect. He may not keep it as a devisee or legatee under the will because there
is a positive rule of law making the subject matter of the gift liable for the
debts of the decedent. Nor may he keep it as a creditor because, under such
circumstances (i. e. the estate being insolvent), all creditors not entitled to
priorities are privileged to share in all of the property left by the testator.
If all that there is to the case under review is that Hayes was testator's
creditor, and the latter directed that his debt to Hayes should be paid out of
the land devised to the exclusion of plaintiff, this direction should have been
disregarded as futile and Hayes, as a matter of principle, should not have been
allowed to hold the land free from plaintiff's claim. Hayes as a creditor did
not stand in a preferred class, and the devise to him should have been considered as an illegal attempt to prefer Hayes over plaintiff.
While it is true that a testator may not prefer one creditor over another,
still if he dies, holding property in trust for another, or holding property,
which he is under a specifically enforceable contract to convey or assign to
another, such persons will be entitled to such property as against any one
taking under the testator, who is not a bonafide purchaser for value. This will
be so even though the testator was insolvent at the time of his death.1O The
reason for the proposition last stated is that the position of the person who is
entitled to the property is regarded as being more than, and differing from, that
of the ordinary creditor. In equity such person is the owner of the property,
which should have been conveyed to him, and, because of this fact, the
property forms no part of the testator's estate, and the latter's creditors are
consequently not entitled to resort thereto for the satisfaction of their claims.
Was Hayes, in the principal case, at the time of testator's death entitled in
equity to a conveyance of the land devised to him? If Hayes was so entitled
the result of the Supreme Court's decision is correct, not because a testator
may prefer one creditor over another, but for the reason that the land devised
to Hayes should have been regarded as his, and was, therefore, not available
for the payment of plaintiff's claim.
Leaving aside for the moment the question of the Statute of Frauds, tes8. Sec. 181 Rev. Stat. of 1919.
9. Sec. 224 Rev. Stat. of 1919.
10. Low v. Welsh (1885) 139 Mass. 33, 29 N.
E. 216; Smythe v. Sprague (1889) 149 Mass. 310,

21 N. E. 383,3 L. R. A. 822; Stokes v. Burlington
Co. Trust Co. (1919) 91 N.J. Eq. 39, 108 At. 863;
Vandever v. Freeman (1857) 20 Texas 333, 70
Am. Dec. 391.
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tator promised to leave the property to Hayes, if Hayes supported him during
the rest of his life, and Hayes had done this. Upon Hayes' completion of the
requested acts, testator was contractually bound to devise the land to him."
A contract to devise land is not specifically enforceable, because a will is always legally revocable up to the time of the promisor's death." Nevertheless
such a contract does impose a legal duty upon the promisor to cause the property to pass under his will in the stipulated manner, and if the promisor dies
without making the agreed testamentary disposition, a court of equity, whenever it is possible, 13will require title to the property to be given to the promisee
just as if the will had been made in the manner bargained for. This result will
be reached by regarding the property as being held in trust by the parties who
took the same under the promisor upon his death and in violation of the latter's contractual duty to will it to the promisee.14
It would seem then that Hayes, in the principal case, (assuming that the
Statute of Frauds was no bar to his claim) would have been entitled to a conveyance of the land, if testator had died without devising the same to him.
Testator would have been under a legal duty to make the devise, and a court
of equity would have regarded the land as trust property to which Hayes
would have been entitled as against all save bonaflidepurchasers thereof. Surely, if Hayes would have been entitled to such rights in the absence of a devise
to him, he should be privileged to keep under the devise which testator was
legally bound to make, and did make. Plaintiff was not in the position of a
bonafide purchaser, and a complete answer to any claim to the land that he
could present is that the land devised to Hayes was, at the time of the death of
testator, no part of his estate, but was trust property belonging in equity to
Hayes.
The question remains whether or no the contract between testator and
Hayes, being oral, was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds?"1 It would
seem that under the Missouri decisions that even though there may have been
no written memorandum of testator's agreement, the contract was specifically
enforceable because Hayes had performed his side of the bargain. There is
authority in this State holding that performance of services rendered in return
for an oral promise to convey or devise land, and as part of a contract to this
effect is sufficient part performance to take the contract out of the Statute.'*
Possibly the position might also be taken that testator's will embodied a
11. Fuchs v. Fuchs (1892) 48 Mo. App. 18;
Wright v. Tinsley (1860) 30 Mo. 389; Gupton v.
Gupton (1870j 47 Mo. 37; Sutton v. Hayden(1876)
62 Mo. 101; Hiatt v. Williams (1880) 72 Mo. 214,
37 Am. Rep. 438; Sharkey v. McDermott (1887)
91 Mo. 647,4 S. W. 107,60 Am. Rep. 270; Nowack
v. Berger (1895) 133 Mo. 24, 34 S. W. 489, 31 L.
R. A. 810; Berg v. Moreau (1906) 199 Mo. 416,
97 S. W. 901, 9 L. R. A. (N.S.) 157.
12. Manning v. Pippen (1888) 86 Ala. 357, 5
So. 572, 11 Am. St. Rep. 46; Lawson v. Mullinix
(1906) 104 Md. 156, 64 Atl. 938; Bird v. Pope
(1889) 73 XMich.483,41 N.W. 514; Colby v. Colby
(1894) 81 Hun. 221, 30 N.Y. Supp. 677, 24 Civ.
Proc. R. 148; Burdine v. Burdine's Extrs. (1900)
8 Va. 515, 36 S. E. 992.
13. It will always be possible to get relief unless
the promissor's heir or devisee has conveyed the
property to a bona fide purchaser.

14. Koch -. Hebel (1888) 32 Mo. App. 103;
Wright v. Tinsley (1860) 30 Mo. 389; Sharkey v.
McDermott (1887) 91 Mo. 647. 4 S. W. 107, 60
Am. Rep. 270; Sutton v. Hayden (1876) 62 Mo.
101; Healey v. Simpson (1892) 113 Mo. 340, 20
S. W. 881; Signaigo v. SignAigo (1918) 205 S. W.
23.
IS. See. 2169 Rev. Stat. of 1919. Contracts to
devise have usually been held to be wthin the
statute of frauds. See Schnebly, Contracts to
Make Testamentary Dispositions (1926) 24 Nlich.
Law Review 749, 754 ,t r.q.
16. Fuchs v. Fuchs (1892) 49 Mo. App. 18;
Gupton v. Gupton (1870) 47 Mo. 37; Sutton v.
Hayden (1876) 62 Mo. 101; Carney v. Camey
(1888j 95 Mo. 353, 8 S. W. 729; Hall v. Harris
(1898) 145 Mo. 614,47 S. IV. S06; Berg v..Moreau
(1906) 199 Mo. 416,97 S. W. 901.9 LR.A. (N.S.)
157; Signaigo v. SignaiZo (1918) 205 S. W. 23.
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memorandum of his obligation. It will be recalled that he devised the land to
Hayes "in the event that he shall remain with me and care for me during my
natural life." This statement seems to recite with sufficient certainty the terms
of the intended bargain. At the same time, however, it should be noted that
the will does not state that testator had promised to devise to Hayes if he did
support him. For this reason, perhaps, the will cannot be characterized as a
memorandum of testator's contractual obligation, but only as a conditional
devise-as an expression of an intention to benefit Hayes by a testamentary
disposition in a certain event. 7 Regardless, however, of the way that this
question might be disposed of, the contract was specifically enforceable because
Hayes had performed his side of the bargain, and under the Missouri authorities the learned Court's decision leaving him in possession as devisee was correct in its result.

J. L. P.
J. T. M.
NUISANCE-INJUNCTION AGAINST MAINTENANCE OF FUNER1
AL HOME. Street v. Marshall.
The defendants, undertakers, purchased a corner lot in a purely residential district of St. Louis and converted it into a funeral home where bodies,
prepared for burial in another part of the city, were brought to be viewed by
friends; occasionally funeral services were held there. The whole establishment was properly conducted so that there was no possibility of the spread of
disease or the emanation of disagreeable odors. The owners of neighboring
property sought an injunction, basing their claim almost wholly on the mental
depression caused to them by the establishment, and they were successful
both on trial and appeal.
Where there has been actual danger of the transmission of diseases from
dead bodies prepared in a funeral parlor, due to the movements of flies, insects
and rodents, and actual annoyance by disagreeable odors arising from bodies
and chemicals, an injunction has been given without much question.' But where
there has been no such danger whatever, courts have definitely denied the
existence of a nuisance founded only on the mental depression resulting from
a knowledge of the presence of the dead.' Some decisions have granted the
injunction on the grounds of both mental depression and possibility of actual
annoyance and physical danger. A few fairly recent decisions have emphasized
the element of mental depression in granting injunctions, although the fact
remains, as in the cases already spoken of, that the preparation of dead bodies
in all stages of decomposition by the use of ill-smelling chemicals was part of
the work of the establishment enjoined.5 In only one case other than the instant one has mental depression been given as a sufficient reason of itself for
17. See Schnebly, op. cit. 24 Mich. L. Rev. 1. c.
779 a scq.
1. (1926) 291 S. W. 494.
2. Goodrich v. Starrett, 108 Wash 437, 184
Pac 220, (1919).
3. Dean v. Powell Undertaking Co., 55 Cal.
App. 545, 203 Pac. 1015, (1921); L. D. Pearson &
Son v. Bonnie, 209 Ky. 3U7, 272 S. W. 375, (1925);
Stoddard v. Snodgrass, 117 Ore. 262, 241 Pac. 73
(1925).

4. Densmore v Evergreen Camp, 61 Wash.
230, 112 Pac. 255, (1910); Saier v. Joy, 198 Mich.
295, 164 N. W. 507, (1917); Higgins v. Bloch,
213 Ala. 209, 104 So. 429, (1925).
S. Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263
S. W. 202, (1924); Leland v. Turner, 117 Kans.
294, 230 Pac. 1061, (1924); Cunningham v.
Miller, 178 Wis. 22, 189 N. W. 531, (1922);
Beisel v. Crosby, 104 Nebr. 643, 178 N. W. 272,
(1920).
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enjoining such an establishment-and that case depended in some degree upon
an ordinance.6
Hospitals for the treatment of cancer, tuberculosis and smallpox, located
in residence sections, have been enjoined because neighbors feared contagion. 7
Butother cases have rejected such fear as a ground for injunction.3 Ordinances
directed toward the restriction of funeral homes in residential districts have
been declared constitutional when tested in cases involving establishments
where all phases of undertaking work were carried on. 9 Yet an ordinance evidently for the same purpose, but which in terms applied only to morgues in
residence sections, was strictly construed so as not to include establishments
where known and identified dead were kept.10
If the scope of a decision is to be deemed limited to its facts, then all the
cases on the subject except the instant one have failed to give protection against
the mental depression caused by a nearby establishment of this kind, with its
visible and audible incidents. They all have back of them something which
supposedly was more substantial and worthy of protection than what we might
call an aesthetic sense. Indeed, the possible liberal effect of the broad language
of Densmore v. Evergreen Camp, a Washington case which relied somewhat on
mental depression, has been limited by a subsequent decision in the same state
which denied that mental depression alone was a ground for injunction while
having the previous case in mind, as shown by the reference to it in the decision." From this resume of the cases it is apparent that the instant Missouri
decision goes distinctly further than previous cases on this subject.
It is believed that the principal case is sound. In the words of one of the
cases, "It requires no deep research in psychology to reach the conclusion that
the constant reminder of death has a depressing influence upon the normal
person ..... Mental depression, horror and dread lower the vitality, rendering
one more suscept ble to disease and reduces the power of resistance." 12
Holt, J., in a dissenting opinion has said, "Who will dispute that the general
welfare of dwellers in our congested cities is promoted, if they be allowed to
have their homes in fit and harmonious or beautiful surroundings? Besides
preserving and enhancing values it fosters contentment, creates a wholesome
civic pride and is productive of better citizens." 1 The home is the place of
rest and relaxation; the place where the children play at the time of their lives
when lasting impressions are easily made, and to have the enjoyment of such
an important institution materially interfered with seems hardly reasonable.
In order to appreciate the possible trend which this decision indicates,
it is well to take note of the situation of the law applicable to the billboard
cases. The courts have almost uniformly held that the police power cannot be

6. Meagher v. Kessler, 147 Minn. 182, 179
N. W.732, (1920).
7. Stotler v. Rochelle, 83 Kans. 86. 109 Pac.
788, (1910); Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47,
111 Pac. 879, (1910).
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Atlantic County, 83 N. J. Eq. 47, 95 Ad. 745,
(1915); Fleet v. Metropolitan Asylum Board, 2
Times Law Reports 361.
9. City of St. Paul v. Kessler, 146 Minn. 124,
178 N. W. 171, (1920); Osborne v. City of Shreve-

port, 143 La. 932, 79 So. 542. (1918); Brown v.
Los Angeles, 183 Cal. 783, 192 Pac. 716, (1920).
10. Koebler %. Pennewell, 75 Ohio St. 278,
79 N. E.471, (1906).
11. Supra note 4,as limited by Rea %,.Tacoma
Mausoleum As'n., 103 Wash. 429. 174 Par. 961,
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12. Saier v. Joy, Jupra note 4.
13. State v. Houghton, 174 N. W. 885. 144
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exercised solely for aesthetic purposes. 4 Ordinances barring or regulating billboards have been upheld in some localities because they were calculated to be
in the interest of public health, safety or general welfare, in that they reduced
fire hazards, lurking places for criminals and shields for immoral practices.13
But these reasons have been characterized as fantastic arguments to bolster
up the decision which the judges hesitated to put on the more important
ground of protection to the aesthetic sense.16 Zoning laws have been upheld on
the dominant factor of protection to health and safety, although incidentally
the element of beauty was recognized."
There is a difference between the injury sustained from the presence of
a funeral home and that caused by the unnecessary ugliness of billboards, yet
it is a difference only of degree. Each arises through the sense of sight, although
the former is aided by the associations which the mind attaches to the sight
of the incidents of death; neither arises primarily from the other senses ordinarily protected, hearing, touch or smell. As has been said, "Our common
law and much of the legal viewpoint which results therefrom, are the product
of a ruder age ..... " and's "If we have come to possess a different sense of
values from that held by the judges who laid down the present rule that aesthetic offenders are not nuisances, the rule should pass." It is thought that the
instant decision is one of the steps in this direction which may ultimately result
in the protection of the aesthetic sense as a factor in the public welfare.
D. S.
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